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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis comprises three empirical studies that investigate the impact of bidders’ social 
linkages with politicians and financial advisors on merger behaviour, M&A deal 
characteristics and takeover returns. The resource based theory postulates that politically 
connected firms have competitive advantage over the unconnected firms in terms of 
privileged access to resources and relaxed regulatory standard. Federal regulatory agencies 
apply relaxed standards when reviewing merger proposals initiated by politically 
connected bidders. Whereas, the private interest theory states that politicians extract rents 
from their connected firms. Politically connected firms might encourage to undertake 
acquisition to protect their political interest. These contrast theories motivate the empirical 
investigation as to whether or not the bidders’ ties with the politicians affect the M&A 
process and its outcome. 
Chapter 3 looks at bidders’ social linkages with politicians and investigates merger 
frequency, M&A deal size and other characteristics of takeover deals initiated by 
politically connected bidders in the USA. It is found that politically connected bidders in 
the USA have a high likelihood of undertaking multiple acquisitions and targeting public 
firms. It appears that politically tied bidders do not prefer cash to finance merger deals. 
The evidence further shows that mergers in unrelated industries and large takeover deals 
are not associated with politically connected bidders. The overall findings suggest that the 
acquisition behaviour of politically connected bidders in the USA is influenced by the 
bidder’s self-interest of market and corporate control. Chapter 4 examines the bidder’s gain 
in acquisitions undertaken by politically connected bidders in the USA. It is noted that 
politically connected bidders in the USA underperform as compared to their counterparts. 
The results further show that politically connected bidders experience worse post-merger 
returns in the long-term as compared to non-politically connected bidders. Even after 
controlling self-selection bias through propensity score matching, politically connected 
bidders experience negative merger returns as compared to matched sample of non-
political bidders. The “private interest theory” doesn’t explain the underperformance of 
politically connected bidders as the USA is a well governed economy and it’s not easy for 
politicians to extract personal benefits from their connected firms to the detriment of 
shareholders. Further, three hypotheses have tested to explore the reason(s) for the 
underperformance of politically connected bidders in the USA. No significant evidence is 
found for the free cash flow and financial constraint hypothesis, which implies that 
underperformance of politically connected bidders is not due to their easy access to the 
capital market. The empirical evidence suggests that after controlling bidder size, the 
underperformance of politically connected bidders disappear. It implies that politically 
connected bidders’ underperformance in both the short run and long run can be explained 
to an extent by the implications of a bidder’s large corporate size. It suggests that 
politically connected bidders in the USA suffer losses due to the agency implications of 
large corporate size which cannot be offset by benefits inherited by their political linkages. 
Consistent with agency theory, politically connections are indicative of agency issues 
within bidding firms which arises due to their large corporate size. The last empirical 
chapter examines the role of the social network hierarchy of financial advisors in a 
mergers and acquisitions framework. Theoretically, more centrally located financial 
advisors who have access to more and superior quality information should help acquire and 
target firms to achieve positive merger outcomes. However, the findings indicate that more 
centrally located advisors fail to create value for both bidders and targets while they charge 
higher advisor fees. The central financial advisors are more likely to be involved in high 
fee generating merger deals, hence they are found to have high likelihood to be involved in 
higher M&A activity, more likely to advise bidders than targets, large bidders, public and 
large deals. The overall results highlight that financial advisors exploit their relative power 
in their network to undertake takeover deals and pursue private benefits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
